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I.

INTRODUCTON

During recent years, the law reviews have been giving much attention to the question whether suburban communities should be permitted to use land-use restraints to maintain their populations at preferred levels.' Scarcely a major review has failed to contribute its piece,
and a few have contributed two or more. 2 The recency of this attention
is hardly remarkable, for the flight of the middle-income and upperincome families from the cities to the suburbs which began in earnest
at the end of World War II was bound at some point to prompt protective moves by the communities to which they were fleeing. Once
those moves were taken, it was simply a matter of time before the
conflicts between the suburban "ins" and the urban "outs" would move
onto the traditional American battleground - the courtroom.8 Once it
0 Lile Professor of Law, University of Virginia. A.B., Princeton University, 1948; LL.B.,
Yale Law School, 1951.
The author wishes to express his thanks to Mr. David Barton for his help with the
economic analysis in this article. If errors in the economics still remain, it is not because
Mr. Barton failed to point them out; it is only because the author stupidly ignored his
advice.
1 During the two-year period between August 1, 1970 to July 31, 1972, over 30 pieces
on the subject were published by the law reviews. Among the better ones published before
and during that period are: Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. Rxv. 767 (1969); Symposium -Exclusionary Zoning,
22 SYR. L. REv. 465 (1971); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARv. L.
REv. 1645 (1971); Note, Snob Zoning: Must a Man's Home Be a Castle?, 69 Mica. L. REV.
839 (1970); Note, The Responsibility of Local Zoning Authorities to Nonresident Indigents,
23 STAN. L. REv. 774 (1971); Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning
after Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YAim LJ. 61 (1971); Note, The Constitutionality of
Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896 (1970); Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YA=au L.J. 1418 (1969).
The subject has also attracted the attention of lay periodicals. See, e.g., Davidoff, Davidoff,
and Gold, The Suburbs Have to Open Their Gates, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1971, § 6 (Magazine), at 40.
2 Of the pieces listed in note 1 supra, three were contributed by The Yale Law Journal, two by Stanford Law Review, and, if symposia count for more than one, five by
Syracuse Law Review. The Syracuse Law Review symposium also includes an excellent
bibliography.
8 See, e.g., Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952),
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arrived there, it would inevitably become live copy for the reviewers.
Nor should it be viewed as particularly remarkable that the writers
have been almost unanimously deploring the protective measures
adopted by communities in the path of the urban steamroller. 4 The
mood in American law schools these past decades has been extraordinarily reformative, and it has not been strange that the writers have
viewed the protective measures as selfish and socially irresponsible.
The flight itself had been bad enough, for it had not only weakened
the cities economically, but also converted some of them into racial
ghettos. But it was outrageous insult, added to already great injury,
when the white suburbanites proceeded to lock the doors to their lilywhite havens by enacting land-use ordinances which seemed to have the
plain effect of pricing suburban living far beyond the reach of the city
poor. No wonder the writers quickly branded large-lot zoning ordinances and other price-increasing land-use controls as "snob" or "Ivy
League" zoning; no wonder they quickly labelled the enacting communities "white enclaves," "sanctuaries for the rich," and "gilded ghettos."
If the prose got a bit choleric at times, at least it was more forthright
than that good gray law review style which had writers of an earlier
generation sounding as though they had been programmed.
But if there has been nothing remarkable about the unanimity
with which the writers have been deploring the selfishness of suburban
political majorities, it is at least close to remarkable that they have also
been strongly urging, with barely a voice raised in dissent,5 that priceincreasing land-use ordinances either be overridden by the courts or be
barred by state legislatures. This is not to suggest that powerful arguappeal dismissed, 44 U.S. 919 (1953); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d
765 (1970); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land and Investment Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax
County v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E2d 390 (1959). Although writers have been strongly
urging that price-increasing land-use regulations, though non-discriminatory on their face,
may deny equal protection to racial minorities and indigents, the United States Supreme
Court has yet to accept that position dearly even respecting racial minorities. See note 31
infra.
4 See note 5 infra. The ascription of selfishness and evilness of purpose to suburbanites
is common in the law review pieces. The sense one gets, on reading the pieces, is that the
striking down of "snob" zoning laws would be as much justified by the injury it would do
to the rich as by the benefit it would produce for the poor. One of the chief points to be
made in this article is that the striking down of price-increasing land-use regulations will
likely, unless accompanied by affirmative action to enable low-income persons to buy into
suburbia, produce more benefits for the non-poor than the poor.
5 Such debate as one finds in the law review pieces is not about whether price-increasing land-use ordinances should be struck down, but rather about who is to do the striking
down. The only dissent which the author has found to the proposition that the ordinances
should be struck down appears in Commentary, 23 ALA. L. RFv. 157 (1970). Implied dissents
may, of course, be found in pieces supporting aesthetic zoning, open-space zoning, and
regulations to protect the environment.
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ments cannot be made for that position; it is only to suggest that powerful arguments can be made the other way. One hesitates to suggest that
essays which claim, however unjustifiably, to speak on behalf of the
poor enjoy a special immunity from academic criticism; but more
plausible explanations of the absence of dissenting arguments on this
issue are difficult to find. If this explanation is, in fact, the correct one,
neither the rich nor the poor may take much comfort from it.
It will, of course, immediately occur to readers of this essay that
there is a significant difference between judicial overriding of local
land-use choices and proscription of them by state legislation. Since
local governments derive their power to regulate land-use from state
enabling legislation, it is dear that state legislatures can take that power
from them or limit its use. Courts, on the other hand, can override
local land-use choices only by interpreting state enabling statutes or, in
proper cases, by determining that the enabling statutes or ordinances
enacted pursuant to them are unconstitutional. Whether there are, in
fact, sound constitutional grounds upon which courts may override
local land-use choices is, of course, a matter of much interest to lawyers.
It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of the recent essays have
sought to devise constitutional theories to support judicial overriding
of price-increasing land-use regulations. It is probably fair to say that
the most persuasive theory thus far advanced is that land-use ordinances
which operate to impair substantially the upward social mobility of
poor persons may, if not justified by compelling public necessity, be
properly regarded as violating equal protection guarantees. According
to this theory, land-use ordinances which, though ostensibly directed
at traditional police-power goals, result in de facto discrimination
against the poor ought to be as constitutionally "suspect" as ordinances
which result in de facto discrimination against racial and religious
minorities. Hence, they should be subject to the same "active" equal
protection review."
An alternative constitutional theory, yet to be carefully explored
in the literature, is that local land owners may be thought to be speak6 The term "de facto discrimination" as used in the paragraph in the text, is a bit
awkward because it ordinarily connotes discrimination which is not compelled or legitimized by law. It is used in this paragraph to denote exclusion of racial or economic groups
brought about by laws which are non-discriminatory on their face. The term "de facto
classification," as used in the following paragraph in the text, is similarly used. For pieces
recommending an equal-protection approach to price-increasing ordinances, see, e.g., Sager,
Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN.
L. REv. 767 (1969); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HAI
L. Rv.
1645 (1971); Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning after Yaltierra
and Dandridge, 81 YALE hJ. 61 (1971).
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ing not only for themselves but also for prospective bidders for their
land when they assert that large-lot zoning ordinances and other profitdecreasing land-use regulations effect an uncompensated taking of their
property. Under this theory, state and federal just compensation clauses
are viewed as intended to restrain governmental interference with
efficiency-maximizing private allocation of resources. If the courts can
be persuaded that the injustice of an uncompensated taking lies in its
potential misallocative effects, i.e., the denial to society as a whole of
optimum use of its resources, injury to prospective buyers of land may
be advanced as a ground upon which local land-use ordinances may be
declared unconstitutional. Although this theory may have the merit of
escaping the thorny issue whether de facto classification by economic
status should be as constitutionally suspect as de facto classification by
race or religion, it has the pronounced disadvantage of having to overcome some four decades of judicial presuming, at least in the federal
courts, that non-discriminatory economic regulations are valid.7
Although the contriving of legal theories under which land-use
ordinances may be struck down by courts is a perfectly legitimate exercise for legal academics, there are, of course, risks associated with the
exercise. Not the least of those risks is the possibility that discovery of
a satisfactory theory will induce some courts to believe that social benefits will necessarily flow from its use. This is hardly to suggest that the
contriving of legal theory should be deferred until social criteria for its
invocation are found; it is only to suggest that sound legal theory, if
based on a misperception of social reality, can produce more harm than
good.
Once the focus is shifted from the question of who can lawfully
override local land-use choices to the question whether such overriding
makes social sense, it makes little difference whether the overriding
authority is a court or a state legislature. That issue may become important later, but the only issue that matters now is whether the overriding is wise." As readers of this essay have already likely inferred, this
7 Compare Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1968) with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965). The question whether an economic "regulation" may effect a "taking" of

property has been receiving much recent attention in the law reviews. In the author's view,
the most intellectually satisfying analysis appears in Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv.
1. REv. 1165 (1967). Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964), and Sax,
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE .J. 149 (1971), are also useful.
Although it is difficult to contrive a textual constitutional argument that just compensation

clauses are intended to restrain economically inefficient use of resources by government, it
is plain that they will tend to have that effect because even governments are sometimes
restrained by price.
8 Not in the sense of embodying eternal truth, but rather in the sense of reflecting
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writer will take the position that the social case for overriding priceincreasing land-use ordinances has not yet been made. More than that,
he will argue that the overriding of such ordinances, either by the
courts in ex post facto review or by the state legislatures' reducing local
land-use control, will not only seriously imperil desirable local autonomy, but also accomplish very little of benefit for the urban poor.
A final word of introduction: It is worth calling the reader's attention immediately to the fact that this essay will be directed solely
against the use of negative restraints upon local land-use choices, i.e.,
restraints which operate to strike down or bar price-increasing land-use
regulations. It is the writer's view that the case for persuading, or even
perhaps compelling, suburban communities to accept their fair share of
the social cost of poverty by taking positive steps to encourage entry of
poor persons is a far stronger one. Although this will seem paradoxical
at this point, the reader is invited to withhold judgment until the arguments are made.
II.

EFFECT OF OVERRIDING ON LocAL DECIsiONAL AUTONOMY

Writers who have been proposing that price-increasing land-use
controls should be overridden by the courts or state legislatures have
not been unaware of the threat which such overriding would pose to
local decisional autonomy. Recognizing that a substantial amount of
local control of local affairs has always been viewed in this country as
desirable, and recognizing further that "participational politics" has in
fact become something of a battle cry of the urban poor, they have devoted substantial intellectual effort to demonstrating that price-increasing land-use ordinances can be generically distinguished from other,
and presumably more desirable, local enactments. The aim of this effort
has been to persuade courts and state legislatures that overriding some
local choices can be principled, i.e., based on reasons which cannot be
advanced to justify more far-reaching assaults upon local government.
Two interesting theme-ideas have come out of this effort. One
idea, which we shall be calling the efficiency theme-idea, is that suburban political majorities, if composed of homeowners, will naturally
tend to zone undeveloped land owned by others into suboptimum or
inefficient use.0 The reason why this occurs is that the homeowners are
simply not restrained by price. Not only do they not lose money when
informed collective preference. The thesis to be developed in this artide is that the consequences which would follow from overriding or barring of price-increasing local ordinances
would not be preferred by most of the writers who have been arguing precisely that action.
9 This theme-idea is thoroughly developed in Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J.
1418 (1969).
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they fix, for example, high-acreage zoning minima; they actually gain
money, for the fixing of the high-acreage minima will, up to a point,
increase the market values of their homes. Since social benefits cannot
be said to flow from inefficient use of economic resources, and since inefficiency-producing land-use ordinances represent a small and identifiable subset of local collective choices, the overriding of inefficient
land-use regulations will not severely undermine local decisional autonomy.
The second theme-idea, which we shall be calling the social mobility theme-idea, posits that local ordinances which price upwards resources essential for the upward social mobility of poor persons ought
to be viewed as invidious as ordinances which operate to deny to members of racial and religious minority groups access to public facilities
and services. 10 Since ordinances which impair substantially the upward
social mobility of poor persons may properly be regarded as denying
poor persons the equal protection of the laws, they should be struck
down by the courts or proscribed by the state legislatures. Although the
mere economic efficiency of such ordinances should not protect them
from attack, communities should be permitted to enact ordinances
which, though hurtful to the poor, are intended to advance a public
purpose important enough to outweigh the harm caused to the poor.
Since the proscribing of official acts which violate equal protection
guarantees can hardly be said to imperil legitimate local autonomy, the
social mobility theme-idea cannot be viewed as a major assault upon
local government.
A.

The Efficiency Theme-Idea

Now that we have a rough idea of what the two theme-ideas are,
we may examine more carefully the hypothesis that economic efficiency
criteria can be used to select for overriding a small enough subset of
local collective choices to leave local decisional autonomy relatively
unimpaired. For our purposes in this discussion, we can simply assume
that all price-increasing suburban ordinances will hurt the urban poor.
Later on we will question that assumption, but it does not hurt us here.
To put the efficiency theme-idea in slightly more technical language, it asserts that in any community in which homeowners are in
the majority and owners of undeveloped land in the minority, the
majority will tend to zone the undeveloped land in such a way that
marginalgains will be less than marginal losses.'1 If a change in a com10 This theme-idea is developed in the pieces listed in note 6 supra.
11 The word "marginal," as used by economists, commonly means "additional" or
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munity, e.g., the adoption of a zoning law, produces marginal losses in
excess of marginal gains, we may characterize it as inefficient. By that
we simply mean that it would be at least conceptually possible for the
losers to pay the gainers enough to persuade them to forego some of
their gain. 12 Although it is often impossible to say, after a change has
occurred, whether the losers could pay the gainers enough to induce
them to forego some of their gain, we can, in the case of land-use regulations, get a pretty good reading of the wealth changes effected by
comparing property values before and after adoption of the regulations.
Should it be the case that a regulation reduced aggregate property
values in the community, we could be quite certain that the losers lost
more than the gainers gained. In making the comparison, we should
have to take care to look at marginal changes in values rather than
gross changes, for inefficiencies may be hidden where gross gains exceed
gross losses; but that is a matter we can look at more carefully when we
get to a concrete example later on.
If this efficiency theme-idea is not yet clear, it will be made so
momentarily; but it may be useful first to dispose of an objection to
the theme-idea which may already be in some readers' minds. That
objection may be that we are heading towards a raw utilitarian analysis
of local political decision-making. If we are to conclude that regulations
are "bad" when marginal gains are lower than marginal losses, do we
not also conclude that regulations are "good" when marginal gains ex"extra." "Marginal production cost," for example, means the additionalor extra cost which
will be incurred in the production of an additional or extra unit of the good being produced -the
"marginal unit." On the consumption side, it is commonly assumed that the
more one has of a particular good, - e.g., bottles of beer or automobiles - the less "marginal" satisfaction or utility one will get from yet another unit of the same good.
12 In any case where the losers could, in theory, persuade the gainers to forego some
of their gains, it means that an unambiguous improvement of collective well-being, as
judged by the losers and gainers, could be achieved by voluntary trade between the losers
and gainers. If A, for example, got only one hundred dollars' worth of satisfaction from
painting his house purple, and B, his neighbor, suffered two hundred dollars worth of injury from living next to a purple house, both parties would end up better off, as they
judged matters, if B paid A, say, one hundred and fifty dollars' to persuade him to paint
his house some other color. To say that an official collective action is inefficient is to say,
at least ordinarily, that had private trade between the gainers and the losers been able to
go on the result would have been different, not necessarily better, simply different. Economists have seriously questioned whether economic efficiency criteria may be used to guide
official decision-making processes. Although there is general assent to the view that benefitcost analysis of some alternative choices, e.g., between building a flood-control dam costing
five million dollars and one costing four million dollars, can, if the figures are not fudged,
be useful, the emerging consensus is that the "goodness" or "badness" of majoritarian
choices cannot be revealed by dollar-counting methods. Readers interested in pursuing
inquiry in this area will find the following books useful and demanding. M. DOBB, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIALISMs (1969); I. LrrrLE, A CRrIQUE OF WELFAR
ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1957). The classic work in the field is A. C. PIcou, THE ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE

(Srd ed. 1929).
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ceed marginal losses? If we do, are we not accepting the ugly idea that
a political majority may impose losses on others whenever the majority
gains more than the minority loses? The answer, of course, is that we
are taking no such position; for the moral assertion that the majority
should ordinarily not inflict large losses to produce small gains hardly
entails the assertion that the majority may always morally inflict small
losses to produce large gains.
As a matter of fact, we do not even mean to say that it is always
immoral for a majority to inflict losses in excess of its own gains, for
that would imply that a majority composed of slaves could not morally
overthrow their masters if the gains to the slaves were smaller than the
losses suffered by the masters.
Even if we were inclined to test local enactments by raw utilitarian
criteria, we should have ample grounds for distrusting our measuring
techniques because it is plain that wealth changes effected by political
majoritarian acts do not necessarily reflect accurately change in human
satisfaction. 18 Thus, a political change which produced a marginal net
decrease in property values might very well have produced a marginal
net gain in aggregate subjective satisfaction. The only reason why we
adopt an economic efficiency approach to local enactments here is that
we are assuming that poor persons will be in the loser group. In sum,
the reader is invited to give his assent only to the proposition that
economically inefficient ordinances which hurt the poor are to be
selected for overriding.
Now, to make the efficiency theme-idea unassailably clear, we will
use a concrete example. We assume the existence of an imaginary
suburban community consisting of 20 farmers who own developable
tracts of land and 100 homeowners who own and occupy single-family
residences on one-acre lots. The homeowners are very happy with the
existing state of affairs in the community. Property taxes are low; the
streets are relatively free of traffic; the schools are good; and the recreational facilities are superb and uncrowded. Moreover, it so happens that
all of the homeowners' houses look out upon adjacent farm land. This

Is If losers were compensated to their own satisfaction, i.e., up to the point where they
would voluntarily have accepted the change, we should be able to say that aggregate satisfaction, as the losers and gainers judged it, moved upwards unambiguously, but we should

not be able to say that the dollar values of the compensation received or the gains to the
majority precisely reflected changes in the subjective satisfactions of all the parties. Having
observed A voluntarily trading with B, we may say, assuming each knew what he was doing,

that each party moved to a preferred position, but since we cannot crawl inside A's and B's
minds, we cannot tell how much satisfaction each got from the trade. When losers are not
compensated, as is usually the case when a law is enacted, we cannot even say with certainty

that a net gain in aggregate satisfaction has resulted.
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gives to each of the homeowners a glorious sense of spaciousness, a feeling that he owns a large estate. Unfortunately for the homeowners, this
state of affairs cannot long last, for the population now threatens to
increase at a ferocious rate. In a word, the time has come for the homeowners to teach the farmers something about the democratic process.
They are about to adopt a zoning law.
To make our arithmetic easy we assume our community is of
minuscule size. Its total land area is 400 acres, 100 of which are owned
and occupied by the homeowners and 300 of which are in undeveloped
farm land. It happens to be the case that farmers find it most profitable
to sell their land in one-acre units to purchasers who propose to build
single-family residences. The current market price for a one-acre parcel
is $5,000.
A town meeting is called, and before the farmers have a chance to
blink their eyes the homeowners have adopted a zoning ordinance
which not only confines the use of the undeveloped land to agricultural
or single-family residence use, but also fixes a five-acre minimum lot
size for residential use. The farmers are absolutely outraged by the
action of the homeowners. It is clear they will take the matter to court
on the theory that the ordinance is palpably beyond the reach of the
police power. Failing that, they will argue that it effects an uncompensated taking of their property. But there are some troublesome figures
they will have to deal with, for it is unmistakable that the ordinance
has increased the aggregate market value of the homeowners' property
more than it has decreased the aggregate market value of the farmers'
property. What has happened is that each of the homeowners' residences
has moved up in market value by $2,000, making an aggregate increase
of $200,000. Under the new zoning law, five-acre parcels will sell for
$22,500, i.e., at an average price of $4,500 per acre. Thus, the farmers'
loss is $500 per acre. Their aggregate loss is $150,000. The ordinance
has obviously produced an efficiency gain of $50,000. It will take a lot
of doing to persuade a court that due process requires communities to
forego such patent increases in the general welfare.
As usually proves to be the case, however, the farmers in this community are not exactly naive when it comes to arithmetic. Going back
over the figures, it occurs to them to wonder what changes in market
values would have occurred had a four-acre minimum been picked
instead of a five-acre one. Consulting some knowledgeable appraisers,
they discover that four-acre parcels would sell for $19,000 - only $3,500
less than the $22,500 price five-acre parcels will bring. Why should this
be? The only possible answer is that prospective buyers of five-acre par-
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cels simply do not value that fifth acre - the marginalacre - as much
as they value the fourth. This is just an example of operation of that
old familiar law of economics and common sense which declares that
the more one has of a particular good, land or what have you, the less
one values yet another unit of that good.' 4 In any event, it is clear that
if land were saleable in four-acre parcels, i.e., at an average price of
$4,750 per acre, the farmers' total loss would be only $75,000. The addition of the fifth acre to the minimum literally doubled the farmers'
loss.
But how did addition of the fifth acre affect the homeowners?
Again, the knowledgeable appraisers give us our answer. It increased
the market value of each homeowner's property by exactly $100. The
aggregate increase was, therefore, $10,000. The explanation for this is
precisely the same as the explanation of the whopping loss caused to
the farmers by addition of the fifth acre. If we can think of the zoning
minimum as having moved up incrementally from, say, one acre to two
acres to three acres, and so on, we can see that each incremental increase
gave to the homeowners more of the same good - protection of their
well-being. Although they had not reached the point of surfeit at the
four-acre level, they simply did not value very high the addition of
that fifth unit of protection - the marginalunit. What is very plain to
see is that the homeowners, to get $10,000 of additional protection,
inflicted a marginal loss of $75,000 on the farmers. Moreover, it is quite
possible, though we will not go through the figures to prove it, that the
move from the three-acre level to the four-acre level also produced an
efficiency loss. 5 For our purposes, it is enough to observe that adoption
14 It is somewhat more complicated than that, for the zoning law introduced an artificial constraint by barring sale of lots smaller than five acres. The only case in which adoption of, say, a five-acre minimum would not result in a decrease in the average per-acre
price would be the unlikely one in which everyone happened to want to buy five-acre lots
or larger. Once we make the assumption that some people would prefer to buy lots smaller
than five acres, we can expect that establishment of a five-acre minimum will reduce the
average per-acre price. The proof of this is not complicated, but it will perhaps suffice for
our purposes to offer an intuitive "proof" in the form of a question to the reader. What
would happen to the average per-ounce price of whisky if a law were passed requiring
whisky to be sold only in five-gallon drums? The average per-ounce price would drop because to buy a one-ounce shot, one would have to buy 639 extras which one would likely
not value as much as the first.
35 By constructing out of wholecloth Aggregate Marginal Gain figures and Aggregate
Marginal Loss figures consistent with our model, we can see where trading between the
farmers and homeowners would have gone had trading been possible:
Zoning Minimum
One-acre
Two-acre
Three-acre

Aggregate Marginal
Gain to Homeowners
$100,000
45,000
80,000

Aggregate Marginal
Loss to Farmers
Zero
7,500
22,500

Four-acre

15,000

45,000

Five-acre

10,000

75,000
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of the five-acre minimum produced an efficiency loss of $65,000. The
farmers' case for overriding the ordinance now looks a good deal
stronger.
We have yet to explain, of course, the economic and political dynamics which brought about this absurd result. Part of the explanation
is very simple. When the homeowners moved from each minimumacreage level to the next higher one, they were not restrained by price.
Had they been required to compensate the farmers for the losses they
imposed upon them, it is clear they would not have gone past the
four-acre level. In fact, they would have stopped at the point where the
marginal gain to them was just about equal to the amount they would
have had to pay to get it.16 But since their gains were costless, they went
merrily on their way. Why did they stop at the five-acre level? It is hard
to say. Possibly because a lawyer in their group warned them that a
larger minimum would tax due process to the breaking point.
But there is a matter yet to be explained. Since the farmers must
have known that the move from the four-acre level to the five-acre level
would hurt them more than it would help the homeowners, why didn't
the farmers offer the homeowners enough money to induce them to
stay at the four-acre level? Since the farmers lost $75,000 by the move
and the homeowners gained only $10,000, there was obviously plenty
of room for mutually advantageous trade. As a matter of fact, the
farmers might very well have won the day by paying substantially less
than $10,000. Assuming that all the farmers opposed the five-acre minimum and all the homeowners supported it, it would have taken a shift
of only 41 homeowner-votes to defeat it. Competition among the homeowners to sell their votes would surely have kept the per-vote price
within, say, the $100-to-5150 rangeyr
Up to and including the three-acre minimum, the farmers could not have paid enough
to compensate all the homeowners enough to persuade them to refrain. But they would
have been able to pay all the homeowners enough to dissuade them from going to the
four-acre level, for the shift from three acres to four acres caused a marginal loss to the
farmers of $45,000 while giving the homeowners a marginal gain of only $15,000. Both
sides would have regarded themselves as better off if the farmers had paid the homeowners,
say, $30,000 to stay at the three-acre level.
lo By consulting the chart in note 15 supra, the reader will see that had the homeowners had to compensate all the farmers for the marginal losses imposed upon them, they
would have stopped at the three-acre level, because from that point on the homeowners
would have had to pay out more in compensation than they would have gotten in gains.
The allocative result - i.e., the fixing of the minimum at three acres - would have been
the same (assuming all parties had to be paid for their losses) no matter whether the farmers had to pay the homeowners to get them to desist, or the homeowners had to pay the
farmers for the right to increase the minimum. (We are assuming away fractional acreage
minima.) For a superb analysis of this important point, see Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. 1 (1960).
17 If we assume away all inhibitions to trade, it seems likely that a payment of $4,100
to the 41 voters would not have been enough, because the 59 non-selling homeowners would
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Here again, we must guess at the answer; but it is not difficult to
identify factors which likely inhibited the striking of a bargain. In the
first place, many people feel uncomfortable about buying and selling
political votes. They simply regard it as morally wrong. It violates the
rules of the game. In the second place, the farmers might well have
simply miscalculated the preparedness of the homeowners to go as far
as they did. It is also possible that if the zoning minimum actually did
move up incrementally, some of the farmers might have thought that
the best thing to do was to give the homeowners enough rope to hang
themselves. Why pay to keep them at the four-acre level when there is
a good chance, if they go to five, a court will cut them back to two?
Even if we assume away these factors, it is quite possible a bargain
would not have been struck in any event. The fact is that each of the
farmers might rationally have thought that his fellow farmers would
do the buying. Why volunteer to chip in on the bid when there is a
good chance of getting the benefit of the deal without paying a nickel?
This tendency to "free-ride" other peoples' purchases does not exist
when the good being purchased is a private good, i.e., a good the benefits of which can be denied to non-payers.18 But when the good being
purchased is of the sort that non-payers can enjoy, a so-called public
good, this tendency can actually thwart the striking of bargains which
would be of advantage to everyone. 19 Since four-acre zoning would be
viewed by the farmers, at least as compared to five-acre zoning, as a
public good, there is a good chance that the efforts of the individual
farmers to jockey themselves into non-paying positions actually prevented them from making an advantageous deal. It hardly needs menbe able to bid up to $5,900 to keep the treasonous 41 homeowners on their side. Once we
get rid of the assumption that the farmers must pay all the homeowners to get them to
desist, we find untrustworthy our conclusion, in notes 15 and 16 supra, that the zoning
minimum, if produced by trade, would rest at three acres. It is probable that it would
stop at two acres, for the farmers would be able to pay as much as $22,500 to keep it there.
That amount would more than compensate 41 homeowners for their "loss" in not going
to three acres, and the 59 other homeowners could bid no more than $17,700 to keep their
41 homeowner-friends in line.
18 The term "private good" is not interchangeable with the term "private property"
for one may have private property, in the lawyer's sense of the term, in a good with some
"public good" characteristics. A, for example, may have legal tile to a mountain, but he
cannot, except at a prohibitive cost, bar people from taking pleasure from looking at it.
Nor does the term "private good" necessarily imply ownership by a private person or firm,
for government owns thousands and thousands of private goods, e.g., typewriters, desks,
buildings, plots of land, etc.
19 The dassic example of a "public good" is, of course, the lighthouse. Once the light
is turned on, all boats can use it whether they pay or not. National defense is also a
public good, for the protection afforded by the army and navy cannot be denied to nonpayers. Although there are good reasons for having a volunteer army, the pay of the
volunteers will likely be on the low side if we wait for volunteers to pay the wages, buy
the tanks, and so on.
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tioning, of course, that bargaining between groups, as distinguished
from bargaining between individuals, can be expensive even if freerider effects are assumed away.20 Although the figures in our model do
not suggest that bargaining costs would have consumed the potential
benefits which would have accrued to both sides if a bargain had been
struck, there can be no doubt that bargaining costs can have precisely
that effect in many situations.
To summarize briefly the essential points ofi--the efficiency themeidea, there is a pronounced tendency of suburban homeowner-majorities
to treat developable land owned by others as something of a free good.
If it is to their advantage to zone it into low-value use, 21 the price system
will not automatically restrain them. This comes about not only because people regard it as wrong to buy and sell votes, but also because
prospective bidders in the loser group, where the good to be purchased
is a public good, will try to free-ride. Bargaining costs may also thwart
the striking of mutually advantageous trade. The chief argument to be
made from all of this is that it can hardly be viewed as a massive assault
on local decisional autonomy to propose that courts or state legislatures
intervene in local decision-making in that narrow range of cases where
irrational and inefficient choices are the inevitable product of forces
beyond the local communities' control.
B.

The Efficiency Theme-Idea Rebutted

The contentions to be made in rebuttal to the efficiency theme-idea
are these: (a) the theme-idea does not carve out a subset of local collective choices which may safely be overridden without impairing local
decisional autonomy; it merely identifies a tendency towards inefficiency
which inheres in almost all majoritarian political decision-making; (b)
since there are plainly more inhibitions to efficient decision-making
operating in large communities than there are in small ones, there
is little reason to suppose that state-level decisions will be more efficient
than local decisions; (c) even if the state legislatures or the courts were
to adopt the firm rule that local enactments must, to be valid, be efficient, it would be impossible in the vast majority of cases to determine
whether a particular local enactment was, or was not, efficient. More20 "Bargaining costs" or "transactions costs" as they are more commonly termed, simply refer to costs incurred in negotiating a deal, performing it, enforcing it, and so on.
A simple example might be this. A has a book which he would willingly sell for $9.00 net.
* would pay no more than $10.00 for it. If it costs more than $1.00 for A and ,B to get in
touch with one another, the deal will not be made. A more significant example of bargaining costs is the costs associated with sales of real property.
21 The term "low-value use" here means a use which the free market values less than

an alternative use.
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over, the broad exposure of local enactments to ex post facto efficiency
appraisal would not only encourage a flood of costly attacks upon local
enactments, but also substantially discourage desirable reliance on the
validity of local law. In sum, the net effect of efficiency appraising of
local enactments might well be to reduce efficiency.
Contention (a) scarcely needs explanation or elaboration, for the
example of the farmers and the homeowners nicely illustrates the only
point that needs making. That point is simply that political majorities if
unrestrained by price, will tend to move past the point where marginal
gain to the majority is equal to marginal social cost.22 The universality
of this tendency is so well known that it hardly requires illustration. Change the homeowners in the model into golfers and the farmers into tennis players, and we shall not be stunned to discover that
"too much" money is being spent on the public golf courses and "too
little" on the public tennis courts. Change the golfers into parents of
school-age children and the tennis players into single persons and
childless couples, and we will likely discover that "too much" money
is being spent on the public schools. Reverse the positions, and we now
expect to find "too little" money being spent on the public schools.
Make the majority car drivers and the minority pedestrians, and we
shall likely find that "too much" money is being spent on the streets
and "too little" on the sidewalks.
The "too much" and "too little" in our examples refer, of course,
to divergences from efficient allocation. Majorities get "too much" because they can tax the minority to pay part of the bill; minorities get
"too little" because the money they would have liked to have spent for
their own preferred consumption is used to buy things the majorities
want. It is quite as simple as that. What is plain is that these divergences
do not occur only in a narrow range of cases. There is a tendency for
them to occur in every case where the cost of benefits to the majority
can be wholly or partly imposed upon the minority. Since it is difficult
to think of a single majority choice which would not permit the thrusting of some costs upon the minority, it is simply preposterous to propose
that efficiency criteria can be used to select, for overriding, a small
enough subset of local choices to leave local decisional autonomy unimpaired.
22 See notes 11, 15, 16 & 17 supra and note 29 infra and accompanying text. "Social
cost" refers to the total cost which society pays for the use of economic goods. In our previous discussion of the farmer-homeowner model, we assumed that the reduction in the
market value of the farmers' property represented the social cost of the benefits which the
homeowners got. Later on we will question whether visible market-value changes accurately reflect all dollar valuations of resource use.
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Although one could end the rebuttal with that, it is worth noting
that the efficiency theme-idea could more effectively be used as an
argument against state-level decision-making. Contention (b) may be
read to assert that, given the tendency of political majorities to overreach by putting economic goods to marginally inefficient use, such overreaching is likely to be less egregious in small communities than in
23
large ones.
Consider once again the factors which were assumed to have played
a role in keeping the farmers and the homeowners in the model from
striking an efficiency-producing bargain. The important ones were reluctance to buy and sell votes, miscalculation on the part of the farmers
of the homeowners' intentions, the free-rider problem, and possible
high bargaining costs. Another factor, not mentioned earlier, must have
been either ignorance on the part of the homeowners of the harm they
were doing to the farmers or insensitivity to that harm.
The point to be made here is that all of the factors listed are less
likely to inhibit efficient decision-making in small communities than
in large ones. To take first the reluctance to buy and sell votes, it must
be said, sadly or gladly, that it is highly unlikely the farmers in the
model would have really sat upon their hands as the homeowners merrily pushed the zoning minimum up to five acres. This is not to suggest
that the farmers would have pulled out their wallets in the voting hall;
it is only to suggest that, given advance warning of the homeowners' intentions and a degree of awareness of the injury the five-acre minimum
would do to them, the farmers would not likely have been reluctant to
engage in some pre-vote negotiation with the homeowners to pull some
of their votes around. The point is that in small communities opportunities for pre-vote dealing are very real. Since the cost of identifying
voters in the opposition are relatively small, and since there are relatively few votes to turn around, the cost of refrainingfrom buying and
selling votes - the cost of being moral, if you insist - is relatively high.
Moreover since local-issue voting quite literally touches the voters
"where they live," it is quite understandable that pre-vote deals on
such important matters as zoning minima tend to be viewed simply as
part of the political dialogue rather than as conspiracies against the
23 Much of the analysis that follows in the text regarding the efficiency of small communities will be based upon M. OLSON, JR., Tan LOGIC OF COLLECrivE AcTION (1965). Readers wishing to explore generally differences between private-market decision-making and
political decision-making will find rewarding J. BUCHANAN AND G. TULLOCK, THE CALCuLus
OF CoNsENr (1962) and R. DAmL AND C. ANDBLOm, PoLriCS, ECONOMICS, AND WELFARE
(1953). By saying that much of the analysis that follows will be based upon Olson's Trig
LoGIC OF CoLLEcrIvE AcTIoN, the writer does not mean to imply that Olson would support
the views to be presented.
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public interest. To put the whole point very plainly, when the price of
24
morality is high, less of it is "consumed."
It is just about as absurd to suppose that the farmers in the model
could have miscalculated the readiness of the homeowners to go to fiveacre zoning. In small communities, dramatic decisions like the adopting
of a five-acre zoning minimum are not sprung suddenly upon the
people. They go through long periods of gestation during which informal and formal debate goes on. Public hearings are held; the local
newspaper brims with articles and editorials about the forthcoming
decision; protest meetings are held; radio campaigns for and against
the proposals are waged; letters are written to the editor; the telephone
circuits are overloaded with political debate. By the time the decision
is ready to be put to vote, the issues involved have been so fully aired
that surprise is simply impossible. By way of comparison, how many
citizens are fully aware of the doings of their state legislature? How
often does one vote directly on a state-level issue? How often does one
travel to the state capital to attend legislative hearings on proposed
state measures? The questions answer themselves.
But what about the free-rider problem and the problem of intergroup bargaining costs? Here again, it is plain that the smaller the bargaining groups the greater the likelihood that trade will in fact go on.
It is well known that the free-rider problem is more significant in large
groups than in small.25 To the extent that the problem is the result of
ignorance about the willingness of others in the group to pay the full
cost of a public good, it is obvious that such ignorance will be less in
small groups than in large. Here again, cost plays an important role
The smaller the group, the more likely some of the prospective gainers
will take it upon themselves to organize the group into an effective
bidding aggregate. The reason, of course, is that organizational costs
are less likely to exceed the prospective gains to the organizers. Once
prospective gainers do take it upon themselves to organize the group,
the likelihood of members remaining ignorant of the need for their
contribution to the bid is lessened. It is also the case that social pressures to be loyal to the group are likely to be greater in small groups
than in large ones. This comes about because contacts among group
members are more likely to be direct and personal. Thus, the moral
cost of being identified as a shirker moves upwards. It scarcely needs
saying, of course, that bargaining costs, both within groups and
24 Given our starting assumption that inefficient land-use regulations will hurt the
urban poor, one comes dose to saying that it would have been immoral for the farmers
not to buy votes from the homeowners.
25 See note 23 supra.
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between groups, are functionally related to the size of the bargaining
groups. The smaller the groups, the lower the bargaining costs.
Even were we to assume that bargaining between the farmers
and the homeowners in the model could not have gone on, there is
reason to suppose that the homeowners would not actually have gone
as far as they did. Political majorities in small communities are more
likely than those in large ones to be sensitive to the harm they do to
the political minorities. This comes about not only because it is
more difficult to gore one's neighbor's ox than the ox of a stranger,
but also because one is more likely to know in a small community
that oxen are going to be gored. The reason, quite plainly, is that one
will be told by the owners of the oxen. The more information one
has about the harm one's vote will do to others, particularly if those
others include one's neighbors, the greater will be the restraining
influence of one's conscience. Moreover, since individual votes are
more likely to affect the results in small-community decision-making
processes than they are, say, in state-wide elections, the restraining
influence of one's conscience is likely to be that much stronger.
The net of all these points made under contention (b) is that it is
very likely that the results which occurred in the farmer-homeowner
model would not have occurred in a real-world small community. To
find some hint that this is true, one has merely to look around for small
communities with five-acre-or-larger zoning minima. The fact is there
are very few of them. What one may also discover, as one looks around,
is that some proposals to shift local zoning control to the state level
may well be grounded in the expectation that state-level decisionmaking will in fact be more inefficient than local decision-making.
One thinks, for example, of proposals in seaboard states that the state
legislatures zone the wetlands to prevent owners from filling and
developing them. The reason commonly given is that the "local communities will not act." But if one suggests to proponents of state-level
wetlands zoning that it might make sense to take by eminent domain
conservation easements in the wetlands, the standard reply is that it
would cost too much. So much for efficiency on the conservation front.
Contention (c) goes centrally to the question whether practical
procedures exist for appraising the economic efficiency of local enactments. For our purposes here, we simply assume that a state legislature
or, though surely less likely, a court has adopted a firm and clear rule
that local enactments must, to be valid, be efficient. Contention (c)
simply asserts that even if such procedures existed; the exposure of
local enactments to ex post facto efficiency testing would cost so much
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that adoption of the rule might very well result in less efficiency than
more.
If we may return once again to our farmer-homeowner model,
we may note one curious element in it which we neglected to analyze
the first time around. That element is the fact that the farmers were
able to get the figures showing a $65,000 efficiency loss by merely consulting some "knowledgeable appraisers." One could have gathered
from the model that the measuring of aggregate gains and losses at the
margin is one of those simple things that appraisers do all the time.
Give an appraiser a hypothetical zoning ordinance, say, one fixing a
four-acre minimum lot size, and by late afternoon the figures will be
ready. Not just rough-and-ready gross figures either; marginal figures.
It requires, of course, hardly a moment's reflection to conclude
that the knowledgeable appraisers in the model must have been
absolute miracle men. Even for them to have been able to give a
moderately useful estimate of the gross change in aggregate market
values which a shift from no zoning to five-acre zoning would produce,
they would have had to do an extraordinary amount of sleuthing. To
get the starting aggregate market values, they would certainly have
had to give the properties at least a cursory inspection. They would
then have had to estimate through some kind of occult process how
much the pre-zoning market values reflected expectations that a zoning
law would, or would not be, adopted. On top of that, they would have
had to be able to generate sufficiently accurate demand curves to
predict within a useful range the new equilibrium prices that would
follow upon adoption of five-acre zoning.2 6 In doing that, they would
have had to separate the zoning impact from other influences operating
in the market such as changes in the income and tastes of prospective
bidders, changes in the zoning laws of other communities in the area,
changes in the prices of other goods, and so on. In a word, they would
have had to use techniques which, quite bluntly, have yet to be
invented.
It is worth noting that even if the knowledgeable appraisers had
been able to measure in advance the gross changes that a move from
no zoning to five-acre zoning would produce, the zoning law would
have, by hypothesis, passed efficiency testing; for the gross figures
showed an efficiency gain of $50,0001 In order to discover that hidden
efficiency loss of $65,000, they would have had to use procedures
known only to God and, of course, a few academic model builders.
26 "Equilibrium prices" are those which equate the quantity supplied with the
quantity demanded.
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That such procedures cannot be the stuff of judicial or legislative
second-guessing of local enactments is obvious.
But let us make the preposterous assumption that appraisers can
do what the appraisers in the model did. Can we now be sure that
our proposed rule, that local ordinances must be efficient to be valid,
will increase the efficiency of local decision-making? The answer, of
course, is that we cannot because it is obvious that the procedures
we should have to use to determine whether local enactments complied
with the rule would, themselves, be extraordinarily costly. The costs
of reviewing local enactments would not be confined simply to out-ofexchequer payments made to appraisers or to the review administrators;
they would also include time-lag costs, i.e., the costs of opportunities
foregone pending determination of the validity of enactments. Since,
by hypothesis, persons would not be able safely to rely upon the
validity of any local ordinance until it had passed efficiency testing,
rational readjusting to ordinances would have to be delayed until
the testing was complete. It takes no special insight to see that such
delays might prove to be very costly indeed.
Query, though, whether a state legislature might not prescribe
in advance objective standards which local ordinances would be
required to meet in order to be valid? An example might be the fixing
by the state legislature of an outer limit to zoning acreage minima,
say, two acres. To permit a degree of flexibility, the state legislature
might set up administrative procedures which local communities
could use to show that higher minima would in fact be efficient.
Communities making such a showing would be permitted to adopt
27
the higher minima.
The first thing we may note about the proposal is that if it rests
exclusively on the notion that local enactments ought to be economically efficient, it may properly be regarded as unprincipled or ad hoc.
Since there is no reason for supposing that local zoning choices are
more inefficient than other local choices which contemplate the thrusting of costs on political minorities, why not fix standards for other local
27 A proposal similar to this one is contained in Note, Large Lot Zoning, 74 YA=IE J.
1418, 1438-41 (1969). The contention made there is that if a "zoning review board" were
created with power to grant dispensations from the state-fixed zoning limit, the state legislature would be less hesitant to fix a low limit. The Note does not attempt to meet the
objections, following in the text here, that the gains of review might be lower than the outof-exchequer and time-lag costs, that efficiency measurements may often be impossible,
and that small communities are more likely to be efficient than large ones. Nor does the
Note, in this writer's view, justify the selection of only lot-size minima for state-level control. All of that notwithstanding, the Note is the most rigorous piece treating the subject
of large-lot zoning in the literature.
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choices? The reader is reminded at this point that we were examining
the efficiency theme-idea to determine whether it intellectually isolates
a small enough subset of local choices to leave local decisional autonomy relatively unthreatened. Unless we can find a ground other
than economic efficiency on which to rest this proposal, we might as
well face the fact that acceptance of it will entail our accepting, at least
in principle, state-level supervision of much local decision-making.
A second point to make about the proposal is that there is little
reason to suppose that local communities are in fact making egregiously
inefficient zoning choices. Nor is there much reason to suppose state
legislatures will make more efficient choices. Were a state legislature
to pick a generously large lot-size minimum, it might well induce
some local majorities to adopt larger minima than they would have
adopted otherwise on the theory, perhaps, that "state policy" supports
it. If it picked a small lot-size minimum, it would undoubtedly bar
some communities from achieving more efficient resource use. This
would likely be the case even were there administrative procedures
through which to obtain an exception to the state-fixed minimum
because, as we have seen, the costs of proving even gross efficiencies
are likely to be high. Marginal efficiencies would in many cases not be
measurable at all.
The net of all this is that the fixing by state legislatures of lot-size
limits is difficult to justify on efficiency grounds. Putting aside the
objection that selection of zoning laws for statelevel restriction would
be ad hoc, and hence, a threat to local decisional autonomy, it is
extremely difficult to think of rational procedures which could be used
to select the lot-size minimum to be fixed. Half-acre zoning may be
inefficient in one community and ten-acre zoning may be efficient in
another. One comes preciously dose to saying that selections of a "right"
lot-size standard would be just about impossible.
A final point to be made about the efficiency theme-idea is that it
would necessarily be biased in favor of resource-use choices backed up
by effective demand. 28 If we may return one last time to the farmerhomeowner model, we may note that the inefficiency of the shift from
four-acre to five-acre zoning was determined by measuring only the
responses of prospective purchasers of lots and residences. Left out of
the figures, simply because they were uncountable, were the unexpressed bids, the latent or ambient demand, of non-buyers.2 Non28 "Effective demand," as the term is used here, means demand actually reflected in
market bids.
29 "Latent demand" or "ambient demand" denotes demand which is not actually reflected in market bids. Bargaining costs, the free-rider problem, and uncertainty about
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buyers might have included tourists who found the five-acre limit made
the community a more attractive place to drive through on a Sunday
afternoon, ecology-minded outsiders who might have regarded the
five-acre minimum as protective of important life processes, outsiders
who, by reason of the five-acre minimum, found the community more
willing to let them use community recreational resources, downstream
water users who might have found the five-acre minimum protected
both the quality and amount of water available to them, and so on.
Although it would be improper to suggest that latent demand
would in all cases tend to support large lot-size minima, it is at least
plausible to argue that current concern about the loss of green space
around urban centers justifies our assuming that latent demand would
at least be tilted in favor of large zoning minima. It is also plausible
to believe that the residents of communities will be better able than
outsiders to get at least a feel for the intensity of latent demand and to
compare it with effective demand. If this feel would amount to no
more than guessing in the dark, the least that may be said is that guessing at the Olympian state level is hardly likely to be better.
C.

The Social Mobility Theme-Idea

Since we have travelled some distance since the first presentation
of this theme-idea, it will be useful to restate it briefly. What it asserts
is that resources which are indispensably necessary for the upward
mobility of the poor can be distinguished from resources which are not.
From the fact that this distinction can be made, it follows that local
ordinances which truly hurt the poor can be selected for review and
possible overriding without seriously undermining local decisional
autonomy. The only ordinances to be struck down will be those which
substantially impair the upward mobility of the poor by pushing the
price of an indispensably necessary resource above that price which
the free unregulated market would ordain. Even those ordinances will
not be struck down if the enacting communities show they were
enacted to advance a public interest so important as to outweigh the
harm caused to the poor. The point is that ordinances which subproperty rights will tend to keep demand from being effective. The fact that demand
remains latent or ambient does not mean that it is trivial, for the demand for dean air,
unpolluted water, national defense, and other public goods is largely of this sort. A point
made later in the text is that such demand as poor persons can express for land and housing in the suburbs will be effective demand, and hence visible to small-community decision
makers. Why? Because effective demand means profits to sellers of land and housing. They
will speak loud and clear "in support of the poor." See note 59 infra, and accompanying
text.
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stantially impair the upward mobility of the poor will be presumed
to be bad until the enacting communities justify their enactment.
Although writers who have advanced this social mobility themeidea have focussed their attention on its possible use in equal protection
cases, we shall not so confine it here. 0 We shall, as we did with the
efficiency theme-idea, simply ask the question whether it makes sense
as a social prescription. For our purposes, it will not matter whether a
court or a state legislature uses the theme-idea to override or bar a
local enactment. Moreover, since we will be concentrating our attention in this section on the impact of this theme-idea on local
decisional autonomy, we may continue to assume for our discussion
here that the poor will in fact be hurt by price-increasing local
ordinances. Our task is to find out whether the theme-idea provides
us with the intellectual tools with which to distinguish substantial
hurts from insubstantial ones. If it does not provide us with such
tools, it is obvious that local decisional autonomy will be much imperiled because there are very few local ordinances which do not price
some resources upwards.
Arguments in support of the theme-idea can be developed. We
take as a starting point a strong public preference that poor persons
be afforded opportunities, at least within their budget restraints, to
acquire those goods and services which will aid them to lift themselves
out of their economic condition. Although this preference can be
amply justified on moral grounds alone, it is plain that increases in
the productivity of poor persons will help us all both by increasing
the total supply of useful goods and services and by decreasing direct
and indirect social costs associated with poverty.
We may also take as given that official acts of any community may
have price effects which are injurious to the poor. When a community
adopts and enforces a building code, it may effectively price some poor
persons out of the housing market. When it compels a manufacturer
to reduce its polluting of air or water, the result may be that poor
persons have to pay higher prices for the goods which that manufacturer produces. When it imposes a sales tax on food, some poor
persons may have to reduce their consumption. When it zones out
multiple dwellings, some low-income persons may be unable to find
housing at an acceptable price.
Finally, we may take it as given that there are positive advantages
to poor persons in being able to reside in suburban communities. It is
30 This is not, of course, inappropriate, since state legislatures are not free to disregard federal and state constitutional commands.
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very plain that many employers of unskilled workers have in recent
years been moving from the city centers to the suburbs either to find
space within which to expand their plants or to be closer to their whitecollar executives. Unless low-income workers can follow the employers
to the suburbs at a cost within their budget restraints, those workers
will simply have to add their names to the already overcrowded welfare
roles in the cities. It is also very plain that schools in the suburbs are
generally of higher quality than those in the central cities. If the
children of the poor are barred entry into those schools, there is substantially less likelihood that they will be able to break out of the
dreary cycle of poverty in which the cities now lock them.
It is also the case that the very concentration of poor persons in
the central cities increases substantially the social cost of poverty. It
does this not merely by increasing the social coefficient of friction,
plainly evidenced by such urban phenomena as high crime and druguse rates, but also by intensifying the psychology of despair associated
with living with and among only the poor in a physical environment
of unrelieved ugliness. This bunching of the poor in the central
cities not only increases the pain of poverty which the poor feel themselves, but also increases immeasurably the costs which the non-poor
must pay to provide even minimum social services to the poor. Were
it possible for even some of the poor to escape from the central cities
to the suburbs, the aggregate social cost of poverty, to the poor and
non-poor alike, would undoubtedly be substantially reduced both in
the short run and the long run.
From all of these plain facts, we can at least draw the conclusion
that suburban ordinances which operate to limit the locational choices
of low income persons, which literally lock the poor in the central
cities, can do immeasurable harm not only to the city poor themselves
but also the non-poor in the cities who now find themselves saddled
with a disproportionately large share of the social cost of poverty.
Even non-poor outside the central cities are hurt by such ordinances
not only because their state and federal taxes are heavier because of
the high cost of urban poverty, but also because the low productivity
of the urban poor denies them useful goods and services.
It must be conceded, of course, that suburban communities must
be entitled to retain substantial control of their own affairs, for there
are positive benefits associated with local political autonomy. Yet, it is
unacceptable that suburban communities be permitted to adopt, for
frivolous and selfish reasons, regulations which literally imprison poor
persons in the cities and also thrust upon others the largest share of
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the social cost of urban poverty. To put the point more plainly, no
suburban community has the right to use the police power solely for
the purpose of making itself into an island of privilege in a sea of
despair. The burden of urban poverty is a national burden which
must be borne by all of the nation's citizens.
It will be argued, of course, that any striking down of any suburban ordinances will gravely threaten all suburban political autonomy; but the argument is without merit. Although it may be the
case that most suburban police-power enactments increase the cost
of some suburban resources, it requires no special wisdom to see that
the pricing upwards of some resources will have devastating effects
upon the social mobility of poor persons, while the pricing upwards
of other resources will have little or no such effect. Nor does it take
training in the arcane arts to see that some so-called police-power
enactments are plainly intended to make the rich better off at the
expense of the poor. One thinks immediately of building codes which
bar the use of inexpensive, though perfectly serviceable, building
materials, or of ordinances which bar trailer camps or multiple
dwellings. That such ordinances serve any purpose other than keeping
low-income families out is fanciful beyond belief. Even if such ordinances could be shown to be economically efficient, i.e., productive
of marginal net increases in aggregate community property values,
we should not hesitate to strike them down because the use of official
collective power to separate income classes is as noxious as the use
of official collective power to separate racial or religious groups. It
hardly needs mentioning, of course, that the economic efficiency of
ordinances which discriminate against persons on racial or religious
grounds will not save them from equal protection attack.
To be sure, it is difficult to devise mathematically precise formulae
to distinguish between suburban ordinances which go "too far" in
separating income classes; yet, it is not at all difficult to fashion a
testing principle with which to distinguish between ordinances which
do inexcusably great harm to the poor and those which do not. Such
a testing principle might consist of two questions. The first question
would be this: Does this ordinance so substantially price upwards the
cost of residing in the enacting community as to impair substantially
the upward mobility of poor persons? The second question would be
this: If this ordinance does have the effect of substantially impairing
the upward social mobility of poor persons, does it advance a public
interest of such a compelling nature as to outweigh the injury which
it does to poor persons? In order for an ordinance to be struck down,
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it would have to fail both parts of the test. A "yes" answer to the first
question would simply shift the burden of proof to the enacting community. Only if the enacting community failed to show that "yes" is
the correct answer to the second question would an ordinance be struck
down.
There is, of course, nothing novel about the test, for the procedure
contemplated is essentially that used by courts to test the constitutionality of official acts which are attacked on the ground that,
though ostensibly aimed at legitimate police-power purposes, they deny
equal protection to racial and religious minorities. 31 Nor is there any
guarantee that use of the testing principle will not result in the overriding of some local choices which deserve to stand. But that may be
said of almost any legal principle. The relevant question is not whether
the testing principle can produce bad results if misapplied; it is,
rather, whether it is likely to do substantially more good than harm.
It is submitted that the proposed testing principle cannot help but
produce more good than harm.
The Social Mobility Theme-Idea Rebutted
Although the reader is probably tired of being reminded that
our attention in Part II is intended to be directed solely at the impact
of the two theme-ideas upon local decisional autonomy, it is particularly important that we mention the matter again here because our
rebuttal to the efficiency theme-idea rather violated the rules by going
beyond the local-autonomy issue. It was convenient for us to do so in
that case, for, given our starting assumption that inefficient measures
hurt the poor, we could go wholly to the merits of the efficiency themeidea by showing that small communities tend to be more efficient than
large ones. In this case, we cannot do that because there is no reason
D.

81 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). In point of fact, the United States Supreme
Court has yet to declare unambiguously that de facto racial discrimination resulting from
police-power enactments which are non-discriminatory on their face always calls for "active
review" of the sort contemplated in the proposed test. It may be that such review will be
confined to cases in which the discrimination touches a "fundamental interest" such as the
right to vote. For a thorough analysis of this question, see Developments in the Law Equal Protection,82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969). Writers seeking to extend the concept of
"suspect classification" to include classification according to economic class have not been
heartened by the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970), and James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Dandridge upheld a Maryland statute
which fixed a maximum limit to family aid regardless of the number of children in the
family. Valtierra found constitutional, on equal protection review, a California constitutional requirement that a referendum be held before public housing could be built in a
community. But the writers have not given up hope. See Note, Exclusionary Zoning and
Equal Protection, 84 HAv. L. REV. 1645 (1971); Note, The Equal Protection Clause and
Exclusionary Zoning after Traltierra and Dandridge, 81 YALa L.J. 61 (1971).
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to suppose that small communities naturally tend to be more solicitous
for outsider poor persons than large ones. Thus, here we cannot kill
two birds with one stone. In Part III we will seriously question whether
substantial benefits will, in fact, flow to the urban poor if price-increasing suburban enactments are overridden or barred; but in this section
we will stay strictly with the local-autonomy issue.
The single contention to be made here is that the social mobility
theme-idea does, in fact, substantially imperil local decisional autonomy because it does not contain sufficiently objective operative
indices by which to determine (a) who "the poor" are; (b) what resources are necessary for the upward social mobility of the poor;
(c) when price increases substantially impair the upward social mobility
of the poor; (d) how many poor persons will have to be absorbed by
communities; and (e) what price-increasing majoritarian preferences
may be justified by compelling public necessity.
In asserting that the social mobility theme-idea does not contain
operative indices by which to determine who "the poor" are, we mean
nothing quite as academically precious as that old bromide that a
pauper in America is as well off as a potentate in an underdeveloped
country.3 2 Our assertion goes very tightly to the purpose which the
theme-idea is offered to serve. That purpose, we take it, is to keep
reasonably open the economic routes through which persons at various
wealth and income levels may move to higher wealth and income
levels. If that is, in fact, the purpose of the theme-idea, then it is
extraordinarily difficult to see how the theme-idea could rationally
or morally be confined to any particular wealth or income class.
To take a very simple example, let us imagine that land prices
and rental rates in a particular suburban community are beyond the
reach of urban families whose annual incomes are lower than, say,
$8,000. A zoning law is now proposed which will push land prices
and rental rates in the community beyond the reach of urban families
with incomes less than $12,000 per year. It is plain that the zoning law
will not block entry into the community of those whom we commonly
think of as "the poor," for they are already priced out by operation
of the free-market price system. Yet, it is also clear that adoption of
the zoning law will effectively make the community something of a
middle-to-upper-income preserve by blocking some upward social
mobility of an identifiable income class.
82 Itis, of course, the case that definitions of "the poor" change with changing economic
conditions. See Woodard, Reality and Social Reform: The Transition from Laissez-Faire
to the Welfare State, 72 YALE L.J. 286, 294-95 & n.15 (1962).
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Our temptation, perhaps, is simply to dismiss the problem as
academic game-playing. After all, it is only the truly urban poor we
are concerned about. Yet, we ought to hesitate because if we allow
the community to adopt the ordinance, we shall clearly be accepting a
number of principles that are difficult to rationalize. One of those
principles would be that there is a point where the right to further
upward social mobility simply no longer exists. A second principle we
would be accepting is that enactments which operate to segregate some
economic classes, e.g., middle-income from upper-income, are perfectly
acceptable. A third principle we would be accepting, perhaps the most
difficult to rationalize, is that the wealthiest communities, i.e., those
whose free-market land prices are highest, need never fear that their
zoning laws will be upset. We might also observe that freeing the
wealthiest communities to zone out middle-income families might
very well reduce the opportunities for low-income families to move
out of the central city because there might be fewer housing opportunities for them if the middle-income families were locked into
their present locations.
The point to be made from these observations is not that these
troubling principles cannot be rationalized by any conceivable intellectual gymnastics; the point to be made is that if they are not
rationalized, the social mobility theme-idea simply does not isolate a
small subset of local choices which may safely be overridden without
seriously undermining local decisional autonomy. This does not mean,
of course, that a state legislature or even a court could not make an
ad hoc choice simply to strike down only those ordinances which bar
entry of families in a specified income class; it means only that such a
choice would fail to meet the test of being reasonably principled. No
community could, if such a choice were made, be reasonably assured
that price-increasing laws barring entry of other income classes would
not later be struck down by new ad hoc choices.
Although we have not canvassed all the difficulties which would
be encountered in attempts to give reasonably rigorous content to the
term "the poor," 33 we had best move along to the equally troublesome
problem of determining what resources are necessary for the upward
mobility of poor persons. Here again, our aim is to determine whether
83 If upward social mobility is to be the theme, will "the poor" include hard-core
unemployables? The aged poor? The temporarily unemployed white graduate engineer?
Is it desirable that the rural poor be included? More important, will the extension of equal
protection guarantees to "the poor" diffuse or dilute protection now afforded to racial
minorities? Specifically, if the suburbs are to be opened to white poor, how many black

poor will get through the doors? See note 45 infra.
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the social mobility theme idea contains, either explicitly or implicitly,
operative indices by which to identify such resources. Since it is extraordinarily difficult to think of any official act of a community which
would not increase the prices of some resources, failure of the social
mobility theme-idea to identify those necessary for the upward social
mobility of the poor would mean that local decisional autonomy
would be much threatened.
What is plain upon inspection is that the words "necessary for
the upward social mobility of poor persons" do not, by themselves,
identify a small class of resources. Putting aside the already-discussed
problem of determining who "the poor" are, we may say that, whoever they are, they require an extraordinarily large number of resources
even to stay at the survival level. If they are to be able to improve
their condition, they will require even more because to the classic list
of food, shelter, and clothing (already a formidable list when one
counts the resources which go into their production) would have to be
added such essentials as educational opportunities for children, technical training for unskilled adults, transportation to and from jobs,
at least minimal recreational opportunities, medicines and health-care
services, and so on.
The point that barely needs mentioning is that the categorizing of
these essentials under such labels as "educational opportunities" or
"transportation" tends to hide the fact that their provision entails the
use of a formidable number of different resources. Thus, local enactments or other official local acts which had the effect of pricing upwards
any of the resource components which went into the production of any
of the essentials would, at least in theory, be vulnerable to attack on
the ground that they priced out the poor.8 4 The suggestion that land
prices are the only prices that substantially affect the social mobility of
poor persons must plainly be viewed as fatuous.
It will be useful to remind the reader at this point that the social
mobility theme-idea, at least as it has been advanced in the reviews,
does not contemplate the imposition of affirmative duties upon sub84 State and federal laws also price upwards resources which poor persons need. Minimum wage laws, for example, price marginal workers out of the work force, and also increase the costs of products which the poor buy. On the local level, building and sanitary
codes price upwards housing costs. Even if the list could be rationally confined to land-use
regulations, query whether set-back and height restrictions, or restrictions barring factories
(employers of the poor), or subdivision-control regulations (e.g., requiring land to be set
aside for parks, etc.) would be invulnerable to attack? Query, too, whether local takings
for parks (i.e., land that could have been used for housing for the poor) or ordinances

requiring payment of a fee for use of public recreational facilities (e.g., beaches, parks, golf
courses, etc.) will be invulnerable?
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urban communities to subsidize provision to the poor of food, shelter,
clothing, and other essentials. It contemplates only the proscribing of
enactments which push upwards the prices which the poor will have to
pay for essential resources. Thus, it will not be an answer, for so long as
we are evaluating only the social mobility theme-idea itself, to say
that the list of necessary resources which the poor will have to buy
for themselves is really quite a small one. Once we accept the proposition, as the social mobility theme-idea invites us to, that the poor are to
pay their own way, we must recognize that the list is hopelessly large. 35
There is another problem with identifying resources necessary
for the upward social mobility of poor persons that deserves brief
discussion. Let us assume for a moment that land prices are the only
prices that concern us. In a particular community, land prices are
currently such that poor persons can enter. A zoning law is now enacted
which has the effect of pricing out the poor. Our question is whether
the social mobility theme-idea interdicts its enforcement. In this case,
we feed into the mix the fact that poor persons will continue to have
opportunities to improve their condition by moving to other communities.
Does the social mobility theme-idea require that the law be struck
down? There are, of course, arguments to be made on both sides. The
chief argument in support of the zoning law is that it does not deprive
the poor of a necessary resource. The chief argument the other way is
that if this law is upheld, other communities will likely adopt similar
laws. Here again, the point is not that there exist no intellectual techniques for picking one argument over the other; the point is that the
social mobility theme-idea does not clearly point one way or the other.
Make the enacting community a classic upper-income bedroom community, i.e., one with few or no job opportunities for the poor, and
we lean towards the view that denial to the poor of opportunities
merely to reside in the community is not the denial of a resource
necessary for their upward social mobility. Add some job opportunities,
and we begin to tilt the other way. To say that effective and confident
local law-making cannot go on in conditions of such uncertainty is to
say only the obvious.
The problem of determining when law-produced price increases
impair substantially the upward social mobility of poor persons is
partly illustrated in the preceding paragraph. But the problem also in3
GEven if we assume that the poor will be fully subsidized, will not price-increasing
laws still remain vulnerable to attack on the ground that they price upwards costs to the
subsidizers? Why should government or private charities have to pay higher prices?
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volves time elements. Does the social mobility theme-idea contemplate
the striking down of enactments which become price-exclusionary long
after their enactment? Again, the theme-idea itself does not inform us.
The answer, it must be supposed, is that we must wait to find out what
the courts and state legislatures do. In the meantime, we had better not
adjust our affairs to existing enactments.
Of at least equal moment is the question how far communities
must go to satisfy the requirements of the social mobility theme-idea.
Does the theme-idea contemplate that communities may close their
doors to additional poor persons by price-increasing enactments once
they have accepted a "fair share" of them? The arguments again go both
ways.3 6 Again, we must wait to find out what the courts and state legislatures will do.
The final unanswered question on our list is what majoritarian
preferences are to be thought justified by compelling public purpose.
Here, we assume that a particular enactment does substantially impair
the upward social mobility of poor persons, and we ask whether it may
be sustained anyway. A simple illustration comes quickly to mind. A
factory in a community happens to be the chief employer of the community's low-income citizens. It also happens to be the only significant
polluter of the community's air. Although the pollutants the factory
emits are not a major health hazard, it is provable that the marginal
savings in cost which it enjoys by using the air as a dumping ground
for its pollutants are lower than the marginal discomfort-costs which
the pollutants thrust upon the community's citizens.3 7 Although it will
be efficient for the community to compel marginal abatement of the
pollution, the result will be that most of the factory's low-income employees will have to be laid off. They will have to move elsewhere to
find work. Legal question: Does the social mobility theme-idea bar the
community from compelling the abatement of the pollution? Answer:
We have not the remotest idea.
Our difficulty here is that the social mobility theme-idea does not
provide us with the intellectual tools with which to evaluate the social
importance of reducing the air pollution. If we use economic efficiency
criteria, we find ourselves saying that poor people can be denied upward
86 Arguments against permitting communities to dose their doors to additional poor
persons may be grounded on the theory that "quotas" are offensive or on the simple fact
that criteria for determining what a "fair share" of poor persons is do not exist. An argument the other way is that the entry of additional poor will reduce the ability of communities to pay for essential social services thereby injuring the poor who already reside
in them.
37 See notes 11, 15, 16 & 17 supra, and accompanying text.
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social mobility if rich people are sufficiently annoyed by air pollution.
But if we do not use economic efficiency criteria, we find ourselves saying that poor people have the right to require resources to be kept in
suboptimum use. It is again time to throw our hands in the air.
The more one thinks about this compelling-public-purpose notion,
the more one becomes perplexed about its meaning. If we consider for
a moment what makes free-market prices what they are, we are compelled to recognize that they can often be the result of private tastes and
preferences which can only be described as frivolous. Yet, it does not
occur to proponents of the social mobility theme-idea to propose that
private consumption, if it results in the pricing upwards of resources
necessary for the upward social mobility of the poor, must be justified
by compelling private necessity. The answer they would give, of course,
is that private consumption is not state action. But that answer really
answers a riddle with a riddle, for it does not explain why the actions
of government (traditionally thought of as an agent of the people) are
more odious than the actions of the people themselves. The point is not
a trivial one in the context of our discussion, for if the social mobility
theme-idea is, in fact, to be confined to official collective action, then it
is likely to operate in a discriminatory way. Large communities will
come within its prohibitions, but some small ones may not. The reason
is that the free-rider problem forces large communities to use political
collective action to acquire such public goods as unpolluted air. In
small communities, very small ones at least, the free-rider problem may
be insignificant enough to permit the acquisition of public goods
8
through private consensual trade.1
The essential points of this part of our rebuttal to the social mobility theme-idea have now been made. To pull them all together in
a single sentence, we may say that the theme-idea would imperil local
decisional autonomy not only by reducing it absolutely, but also, by
reason of the extensibility of the principle underlying it, by injecting
into local decisional processes substantial uncertainty about the validity
of many price-affecting actions.
A final point and we are done. We observed in the opening paragraph of this rebuttal that there is little reason to suppose that small
communities naturally tend to be more solicitous for outsider poor
persons than large ones. Yet, it may be said that the greater tendency
8 See note 19 supra and also text discussion following note 23 supra. It is plain, of
course, that many suburban communities do not need either zoning laws or private landuse restrictions to keep out the non-rich, for the residents simply choose to use up the land
in gigantic estates. They simply outbid the non-rich.
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towards decisional efficiency in small communities tends to assure outsider poor persons that their effective demand for scarce community
resources will at least be counted in the political decisional process.3 9
Since "the poor," however we may define them, rarely will constitute
a political majority in state-level decision-making processes, proposals
to undercut local decisional autonomy "for the sake of the poor" seem,
to put it gently, a bit mischievous.
III.

IMPAcT OF PRICE-EXCLUSIONARY ZONING ON THE URBAN POOR

The chief aim of Part II of this essay was to demonstrate that
neither the efficiency theme-idea nor the social mobility theme-idea
successfully isolates a small and identifiable subset of local choices
which may be overridden or proscribed without substantially undermining local decisional autonomy. The thrust of the argument in Part
II was that efforts to confine the range of applicability of the themeideas would likely lead to ad hoc preempting of local decisional power
by courts or state legislatures. This would result, we argued, because
the principles underlying both theme-ideas do not yield to principled
limitation.
It is now time to recognize that many persons might reasonably
regard the preservation of local decisional autonomy as too costly if it
entails standing idly by as suburban political majorities use the police
power to do grievous harm to the urban poor. If we wait for the legal
theoreticians to devise satisfactory principles with which to limit interference by the courts or state legislature in local affairs, we may well
discover that the injury we have prevented is less serious than the injury
40
we have allowed.
Two contentions will be made here. The first is that the striking
down or proscribing of suburban price-exclusionary zoning laws will
likely not yield benefits to the urban poor in excess of the harm caused
to local decisional autonomy. The second contention is that affirmative
state and federal legislative action to bring about some dispersal of the
89 See note 28 supra. See also text discussion following note 23 supra. The point, made
earlier, is that effective demand means counted demand. In small communities, the voices
of land owners who would make a profit from selling land to low-income persons will more
likely be heard and paid attention to by the majority.
40 Query, for example, whether the Supreme Court should have waited for the fashioning of a "neutral principle" before declaring in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948),
that state enforcement of private racial restrictions constitutes forbidden "state action"?
Assuming the decision was ad hoc or unprincipled, on what ground could one assert that
the harm from making the decision exceeded the harm that would have followed had it
not been made? See A. BicKEr, THE LEAs DANGEROUS BRANCH 49-65 (1962); H. Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, in H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, PoLrrCS
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw (1961).
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urban poor to smaller communities will not only reduce the social cost
of poverty, but also do less injury to local decisional autonomy.
Turning to the first contention, we may observe that there are two
kinds of harm to the urban poor which the striking down of price-exclusionary suburban zoning laws might be expected to reduce. One
kind is psychological, the kind of harm one suffers when official action
appears to legitimize private prejudice. When the law declares that
blacks are inferior to whites, it not only liberates and encourages white
bigotry, but also fosters black self-hatred. When the law discriminates
against women, it not only increases male chauvinism, but also encourages women to adopt disparaging self-images. These consequences are
not difficult to understand, for we are taught from childhood to respect
the law and to obey it. Since it is our parents who produce in us the
"set" to respect and obey the law, the law speaks to us with special authority even when it speaks in the voice of the bigot.
Were it the case, then, that suburban land-use ordinances give official voice to private prejudice against the poor, we should have good
reason to strike them down. But it is strongly arguable they do nothing
of the sort. To make that argument we should not have to rely solely
on the innocent appearance of the words of the ordinances; we should
also be able to rely on inspection of our consciences, for surely it will
be the rare man or women who regards as stigmatizing the condition of
having no money. In a country in which it is a political advantage to
have been born poor and in which the common boast of the successful
businessman is that he was once poor, it is difficult to equate the assertion that Jones is poor with the assertion that Jones is inferior or even
different from us.
We may hear it said that some of the poor are lazy or that some of
them cheat on welfare, but that is far different from saying that the
poor are lazy or that the poor cheat on welfare. In this country, poverty
is hateful, but the poor are not. To ascribe to suburbanites hatred of
the poor, qua poor, is to suggest either that those who move to the
suburbs are moral defectives before they go or that they become such
when they get there. In either case, the ascription is not merely absurd,
it is, itself, a good example of prejudice.
It would be equally absurd, of course, to suppose that suburban
majorities never adopt laws to keep the poor out. What suburbanites
know, as we all know, is that entry of poor persons into communities,
at least in substantial numbers, not only increases out-of-pocket socialservice costs, but also decreases community amenity. To say that it is
morally reprehensible for suburbanites to dislike these consequences
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is simply silly. The most we can say is that acting upon that dislike is
immoral. But that is far from saying that suburbanites are prejudiced
against the poor. The zoning out of trailers and multiple dwellings
from suburban communities may be morally despicable if it does economic injury to poor persons, but dislike of the look of trailers and
multiple dwellings is something less than proof positive of prejudice.
If the case is to be made for striking down suburban zoning ordinances, it will have to be made on the ground that the ordinances do
positive economic harm to the urban poor by closing them off from
opportunities to improve their condition. The argument we will make
here is that purely negative restraints upon suburban zoning practices,
i.e., restraints which merely forbid the enforcement of price-increasing
land-use ordinances, are at least as likely to hurt the urban poor as to
help them.
Our fundamental hypothesis, already alluded to in Part II, is that
price-increasing suburban land-use regulations are not keeping out the
urban poor; they are keeping out urban families in the lower-middle
and middle-income classes. To put the same point somewhat differently,
the striking down of price-increasing suburban land-use ordinances is
more likely to accelerate the flight from the cities of lower-middle-income and middle-income families than the flight of the lowest income
families. Moreover, since it will commonly be the case that the fleeing
families will be white, the result will be further ghettoization of the
cities. To the extent that blacks will be able to flee at all, they will
likely be the very persons whose loss the urban black communities will
least be able to stand.
Now, what will the striking down of, say, a price-increasing suburban large-lot zoning ordinance do? A common result will be to increase
the average per-unit price of the affected land while decreasing the
price of moving to suburbia. We saw this process in reverse in our
farmer-homeowner model. Before the five-acre minimum was adopted,
one-acre lots sold for $5,000. The five-acre minimum pushed the average
per-acre price down to $4,500 while pushing the price of buying a "residence lot" up from $5,000 to $22,500. In characterizing large-lot zoning
ordinances as "price-increasing," we obviously refer to the price of a
"residence lot," not to the average per-acre price.41
Now the point, almost too obvious to make, is that the free-market
price of moving into suburbia is not at all likely to be within the
budget restraints of urban families who may meaningfully be describdd
as "poor." "Poor families," as the term is commonly used, means fami41 See

note 14 supra, and accompanying text.
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lies who literally do not know where the next good meal is coming
from. To poor families of that sort, the reduction to the free-market
level of the price of moving to suburbia will be about as helpful as a
modest reduction in the price of Cadillacs. Even if we abandon those
poor to the cities and move to the next higher income level, call it the
"low-income" level, we will still be talking nonsense if we talk earnestly
about their buying into suburbia at free-market prices because living
in suburbia is simply not a low-income family's good.
To make matters worse, it is not unlikely that the free-market
price of suburban land would move upward if "poor" or "low-income"
families were provided with the wherewithal to enter the market. This
might come about not only because their own bids would thicken the
market,42 but also because their bidding might scare into the market
suburban residents feariul of increases in social service costs and loss of
community amenity. It is a plain, if ugly, fact of life that it is often
"rational" for upper-income persons to bid more for land when they
are competing with low-income bidders than when they are competing
with upper-income bidders- not moral; rational. 43 No wonder the
land owner who can get an auction going between those wishing to buy
to build a low-income housing project and those opposing it can expect
to become a wealthy man overnight.
To return to our theme, if we are right in believing that "poor"
and "low-income" families will not be able to buy their way into suburbia at free-market prices, unless, of course, their incomes are increased
by subsidy, then it follows that the mere striking down of suburban
price-increasing land-use ordinances may, in fact, hurt poor and lowincome families in the cities by encouraging the flight from the cities of
some productive lower-middle-income and middle-income residents.
This might, of course, produce a temporary reduction of housing costs
in the cities and possibly, though less likely, some job vacancies for lowincome workers to fill. However, in the long run, the exodus would
likely merely further erode the cities' economies.4
42 The addition of the new demand would, technically, shift the aggregate demand
curve to the right. Less technically, the more money chasing after scarce resources, the
higher the price.
43 It is "rational" because the proximity of low-cost housing to high-cost housing will
reduce the market value of the high-cost housing. If it is immoral to bid against poor
persons buying land, is it less immoral to bid against them for food, clothing, and other
essentials? In point of fact, it is difficult to think of any bids by upper-income persons
which do not draw away resources which the poor could have used. Nonetheless, many
readers will likely share the writer's intuitive sense that outbidding the poor in land markets in order to preserve property values is more offensive than bidding away from them
other goods.
44 Itis well known that many of the urban poor get their housing through the process
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It needs to be mentioned also that the striking down of price-increasing suburban land-use ordinances may increase the ghettoization
of the cities. This effect would be most pronounced if, as we have supposed, free-market land prices in the suburbs were in the reach only of
families in the lower-middle or higher income ranges because a majority of those families would likely be white. But the effect might be
significant even if suburban land prices fell to levels within the reach
of low-income families, for it is simply easier for white families to move
to white suburbs than it is for black families to move there.45 Moreover, if moving to the suburbs to improve one's economic condition
may be taken as evidence of drive and ambition, the blacks who do go
may be precisely the kind of people the urban black communities will
sorely miss. The point is obviously a debatable one, but the fear of some
blacks that the political power of urban blacks will be weakened by
geographic dispersal cannot be dismissed out of hand.
To summarize the arguments we have made in support of our first
contention in Part III, we may say that it is highly unlikely that the
striking down of price-increasing land-use ordinances will reduce the
price of entry into suburbia far enough to put it in reach of "poor" or
"low-income" urban families. The more likely result will be that it
will accelerate the flight of higher-income families, thereby further
eroding the cities' economies. Short-run benefits to the urban poor in
the form of lower housing costs and increased job opportunities will
likely be overcome by long-run losses. Finally, it is likely that ghettoization of the cities will be increased. The net of these points is that if
justification for the undercutting of local decisional authority is to be
found, it will not likely be found in benefits flowing to the urban poor.
The arguments in support of our second contention, that af1irmaknown as "filtering," i.e., the sale by city-fleeing middle-income and upper-income families
of their housing to enterpreneurs who convert it, by using partitions and other devices, to
low-income multiple dwellings. But if the fleeing families are not replaced by other middleincome and upper-income families, the gains to the poor from better housing may well
be wiped away as the cities' ability to provide essential services decreases. See J. ROT-mNBERG, ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF URBAN RENEwAL 88-89, passim (1967).

45 Black families may pay a heavier psychological cost not only because they may feel
that they are entering a hostile environment, but also because they may feel that they are
being disloyal to blacks left behind in the cities. Their out-of-pocket costs may also be
higher because of increased bidding by resistant whites or by more blatant finagling with
the suburban land market. It is nothing less than remarkable that writers who have been
urging the overriding of price-increasing suburban land-use ordinances have given little or
no attention to the effect it would have on the racial composition of the cities. Concern seems
to be directed solely at the racial composition of the suburbs. See, e.g., Note, Large Lot
Zoning, 78 YALE LJ. 1418, 1481 (1969). The argument being advanced in this article is that
the striking down of such ordinances will likely bring more whites to the suburbs. Put
another way, poor whites are likely to get more "equal protection" than poor blacks.
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tive action will be more beneficial to the urban poor and less hazardous
to local decisional autonomy, have already been impliedly made. This
writer does accept the argument (made in section C of Part II) that if
substantial numbers of the urban poor can be persuaded to move to
smaller communities, the social cost of poverty will be much reduced.
Since this desirable dispersal of the urban poor will not automatically
follow upon the mere striking down of price-increasing suburban landuse ordinances, it seems plain that the dispersal will have to be accomplished through subsidy.
This will entail, among other things, governmental acquisition of
land for housing in the communities to which the urban poor are to
move. While there is no reason why government should be insensitive
to the costs which entry of poor persons will thrust upon the communities they enter, there is also no reason why government must defer to
local land-use preferences. If necessary, those preferences can be preempted by exercise of the power of eminent domain. Since the taking of
land for public use or purpose does not rest on any new principle which
could be regarded as substantially undermining local decisional autonomy, it may be viewed as preferable to procedures which threaten
wholesale overriding of local choices.4 6
A second advantage to affirmative dispersal programs is that they
would be selective. Since eligibility for subsidy would, presumably, be
limited to persons with specified income and employability characteristics, we should not expect to find the programs operating in a catch-ascatch-can manner. It needs to be said, of course, that dispersal programs
may result in some dilution of the political power of urban minority
groups. But it is at least arguable that some dispersal of the urban poor
will, in the long run, reduce the need for political groupings along
racial and ethnic lines. Such, at least, has long been our national faith.
46 It cannot be seriously doubted that the federal and state governments can take land
by exercise of the power of eminent domain and put it to uses inconsistent with local
zoning laws. See Note, Government Immunity from Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARv.
L. REv. 869 (1971). The important point is that the taking of property to provide housing
for the poor would not wipe out zoning ordinances with a wide brush, for only land
selected for taking would be affected.

